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I.  Introduction
The U.S. peanut program has restricted peanut production and increased the price received by
farmers since 1949.  (See Rucker and Thurman, 1990, for a history of the peanut program and its
effects.)  Unlike the programs for grains, cotton, and rice, the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement
and Reform (FAIR) Act left the peanut program largely intact.  As before FAIR (and since 1977) the
right to grow peanuts for the domestic edible market is embodied in marketing quota, which can be
leased and sold.  Also as before FAIR, the right to grow peanuts to be exported or crushed into oil and
meal is unrestricted.  (See Borges and Thurman, 1994, and Babcock, 1990, for analyses of peanut
supply in light of "additionals" production.)  What did change post-FAIR was the set of restrictions on
the lease and transfer of quota.
Prior to 1996, lease and sale transactions were largely unrestricted within counties, but were
prohibited across county lines.  This led to geographically distinct markets for peanut quota with little
tendency for quota lease rates and sales prices to equalize across counties.  The FAIR Act for the first
time allowed quota movement across county lines other than for the purpose of consolidating holdings2 On its face, the 53% figure for Texas appears to violate a transfer provision of the FAIR Act. 
There are, however, unlimited transfers allowed between adjacent counties, which likely explains the
seemingly excess movement.
2
by firms operating in multiple counties.  FAIR set up a schedule of phased-in relaxation of transfer
restrictions.  Quota movement out of a county in 1996 was limited to 15 percent of 1995 quota.  In
1997, the cap moved upward, allowing 25 percent of 1995 quota to be leased or permanently sold out
of a county. In annual increments of 5%, the allowable transfer increased to 35% by 1999.  In 2002,
the limit will reach its currently scheduled maximum of 40%.
Quota rentals represent significant income streams to quota owners and significant costs to
peanut growers.  The movement of quota and associated changes in lease rates imply important welfare
effects to these groups and we now have four years of experience with peanut quota markets post-
FAIR.  In some parts of the country, quota has moved as much as the regulatory caps allow.  For
example, between 1995 and 2000 in Texas, cross-county quota movement represented 53% of 1995
quota2.  Other areas have seen less, but still substantial, movement: in Oklahoma 36% of 1995 quota
had migrated by 2000.  But in the traditional peanut-growing areas of the Southeast there has been less
cross-county movement: in Georgia and Alabama, 9% of quota moved across county lines, in Florida
8%, and in North Carolina and Virginia 7%.
In this paper we present a model of the effects of cross-county quota transfer and test empirical
predictions from it with a county-level panel of pre- and post-FAIR data to assess the effects of
changes in U.S. peanut policy.  We have compiled from USDA-FSA sources data on quota
movements for virtually every peanut-producing county in the seven major peanut-producing states. 3 The share of Texas production held by the five largest counties in 1994 was 32%.  In 1998
the five-county share grew to 65%.  The increase in the share represented by top-five county
production came from a dramatic reduction in the share of production from the 101 smallest peanut
producing counties.  These 101 counties accounted for 50% of peanut production in 1994 but only
20% by 1998.  (The share of production from a middle-sized category remained stable over the four-
year period.)  The production from small counties declined in absolute terms as well.
4 Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.
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Analysis of the data shows large quota movements in areas where observations on additionals
production would have predicted such.  We find that movements in production, as distinct from
movements in quota, such as the large shifts found in Texas3 cannot be explained entirely by FAIR, but
can reasonably be attributed to changes in the profitability of growing competing crops such as cotton. 
The reduced profitability of the latter might itself be attributed in part to the elimination of cotton
deficiency payments.
II.  The U.S. Peanut Program and Restrictions on the Transfer of Quota
Peanut production is concentrated almost entirely in seven southern states4 and is an important
source of income in many local economies.  There are two peanut markets, separated both by end-use
of the peanut and by government policy—the edible market and the crush market.  Peanuts sold into
the edible market are used in such products as salted-in-the-shell peanuts, candy bars, and peanut
butter.  Peanuts sold into the crush market are used to produce peanut oil, cake, and meal.  Peanut oil
is consumed by humans but is not included among “edible” uses for policy purposes.  Peanut cake and
meal are animal feeds.
Government programs regulating peanut prices and production have been in effect since the5 A trivial amount of quota leaked across county borders.  Intercounty transfers were allowed
in states with less than 10,000 pounds of quota and when an individual owned or operated land in
contiguous counties.  Because such transfers were not the norm and because they had little effect on the
locational distribution of quota, we do not consider them further.
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1930s.  The current peanut program includes a price support for peanuts sold into the domestic edible
market, poundage quotas placing upper limits on the peanuts produced and sold as edibles by
individual growers, and highly restrictive quotas on peanut imports.  The edible (or quota) support price
is the minimum legal price in the domestic edible market and the price at which the government will buy
quota peanuts.  Only growers with poundage quota can sell their peanuts directly into the edible market
for this price.  Peanuts grown without poundage quota are known as “additionals” and must be sold in
the export market or placed in growers' association pools.  The transfers and deadweight costs
associated with these aspects of the peanut program have been estimated elsewhere (see Rucker and
Thurman (1990), U.S. GAO (1993)). Here we focus on the effects of the restrictions on quota
transfers.
Until 1977, the primary tool used to restrict the level of output under the federal peanut
program was acreage allotments.  Although marketing quotas were specified annually, they were set to
exceed the quantity of peanuts typically grown on the allotted acres.  In December 1967, legislation
was enacted that authorized the sale or lease of acreage allotments for the 1968 and 1969 crop years. 
The transfer provisions were made permanent in 1969, but approval of the transfer by the Secretary of
Agriculture was required.  The sale and lease of allotments was permitted only within counties.5
Under the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977, poundage quota was required to sell peanuts
into the domestic edible market for the high quota support price.  Growers could grow more than their6 A grace period was provided, so that no quota actually was forfeited for two years following
this modification of the program rules.
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poundage quota (within the limitations of their acreage allotments), but these “additional” peanuts could
not be sold directly into the domestic edible market.  Unrestricted lease and sale of poundage quota
was permitted within counties.  
The farm bill of 1981 suspended acreage allotments.  Under the new version of the program,
anybody was allowed to grow peanuts, but only those growers with poundage quota could receive
directly the quota support price.  Another potentially important change was the restriction under the
legislation of quota owners' rights to lease their quota.  To maintain ownership of poundage quota,
peanuts had to be grown on the farm to which the quota was assigned in two out of any three
consecutive years.6  A quota owner could lease his quota without losing it, but only so long as peanuts
were grown on his farm.  
The potential effects of this program change on quota lease markets are limited by the manner
in which the program is administered by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
(ASCS)/Farm Services Agency (FSA).  The ASCS/FSA, as part of its standard procedures, has
allowed farms to be “combined” so that, from the perspective of the legislation, two separately owned
farms become a single farm.  Thus, a quota owner can lease his quota to another individual indefinitely
without losing it, so long as their farms have been combined.    
An important feature of the peanut program is that peanut growers are allowed to grow
“additionals” (beyond the amount of their poundage quota) for sale in the export market or for
placement with growers' association pools.  The price of these additionals is less than the quota support7 See Rucker and Thurman (1990) for an explanation of why the price of additionals sold for
export and the expected price for additionals placed in association pools will tend to be equal.
8 The analysis that follows demonstrates the effects of eliminating restrictions on the lease and
transfer of peanut quota under the assumption that there are no restrictions on intracounty leasing of
quota.  The interpretation of this analysis as showing the effects of eliminating restrictions on intercounty
quota transfers under the current peanut program requires the assumption that ASCS/FSA provisions
for “combining” farms completely eliminate any effects that the two-out-of-three year leasing rule in the
1981 farm bill (see discussion above) might have on quota lease markets. Further, we assume that all
peanuts produced in the U.S. are edible grade peanuts that can be used for either edible or nonedible
(crush) uses.  That is, there is no difference in the costs of producing quota and additional peanuts and
additional peanuts can be used for edible purposes.  See Rucker and Thurman (1990) for further
discussion of issues related to this assumption.
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price and represents the foreign demand price for U.S. edible peanuts.7  The price difference between
quota peanuts and additionals implies that the quota rights have value.  With binding restrictions on
production for the domestic edible market, and with no restrictions on the transfer of quota, positive
lease and sale values for peanut quota will be observed and any aggregate level of output will be
produced at minimum cost.  When markets for quota are restricted, however, output may be produced
at a cost in excess of the minimum.  
Consider first the marginal cost of producing peanuts and the related demand for poundage
quota within a single county.  The relationships among quota support price (PS), world price (Pw),
marginal costs of production, and the rental demand for quota are illustrated in Figure 1.8  Because
additionals production is unrestricted, Pw is the relevant marginal price for additionals.
With zero quota allocated to the county, q0 additionals will be produced at price Pw.  For levels
of quota less than q0, a competitive market for quota within the county will dictate a demand price for
quota of PS - Pw, the price difference to which an incremental unit of quota entitles growers.  If the9 An implication of this discussion is that if quota in the county is less than q0, then increments in
quota will displace additionals production one-for-one and will not change total county production. 
Increments in quota between q0 and q1 will increase total county production one-for-one as additionals
production is zero when quota exceeds q0.  Increments in quota beyond q1 will not increase production
because the marginal cost exceeds the quota support price.
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county's quota allocation is less than q0, all the quota will be used and the difference between q0 and the
quota amount will be the quantity of additionals produced.  For quota levels greater than q0, the
opportunity cost of producing and selling quota peanuts is the  marginal cost of producing peanuts,
which exceeds Pw.  The value of the marginal product of quota is therefore the quota support price (PS)
less the marginal cost of production (MC).  With a quota allocation between q0 and q1, quota rental
rate will vary inversely with the level of quota and no additionals will be produced.  If the allocation of
quota is q1 or greater, the quota rental rate will be zero.9
The costs of restrictions on quota transfers between counties are illustrated in Figure 2, where
MC1 and MC2 are the marginal costs of production in counties 1 and 2, and Qq is the poundage quota
allotted to each county (assumed for graphical simplicity to be the same in each county).  Because each
county is a price taker in the domestic and world markets, the demand price each faces is PS up to Qq
and Pw thereafter.  If poundage quota cannot be transferred between counties, total production in
county 1 is q0 (consisting of Qq quota peanuts and q0 - Qq additionals) while total production in county
2 is Qq (all quota peanuts).  The marginal cost in county 1 is Pw and the quota lease rate is PS - Pw. 
The marginal cost in county 2 is P2 and the quota lease rate is PS - P2.
The gains from making quota transferable across counties are shown in Figure 2 as follows. 
When restrictions on transferability are removed, production will be achieved at minimum cost.  The10 Note that in Figure 2, making quota transferable across counties reduces the production of
additionals but does not alter the production of quota peanuts.  Total production of edibles is still 2Qq
with q2 being produced in county 2 and q1 being produced in county 1.  In this instance, production of
additionals falls to zero.  We demonstrate in the Appendix that only if the total quantity of quota were
small enough to raise its price to Ps-Pw would there be production of additionals in the unrestricted
equilibrium.
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aggregate marginal cost of producing any given quantity of peanuts is the horizontal summation of the
marginal cost curves for the individual counties, MNMCT.  The demand curve facing the combined
counties is PSCHPw
'.  In the case shown in Figure 2, demand and aggregate marginal cost intersect at
QT (=2@Qq), implying that the least-cost allocation of production is q1 in county 1 and q2 in county 2
with both counties producing only quota peanuts.  The market-clearing quota lease rate is PS - PT.10
Allowing intercounty transfers of quota thus reduces the lease rate and increases production in
county 1 and increases the lease rate and reduces production in county 2.  Qq - q2 (= q1 - Qq) pounds
of quota are transferred from county 2 to county 1.  In county 1, q1 - Qq pounds of quota with value of
BDIJK are purchased for BDIG, implying an aggregate gain of GIJK.  In county 2, Qq - q2 pounds of
quota with value of ABEF are sold for ABGF, implying an aggregate gain of EGF.  The total increase in
producer surplus from making quota transferable across county lines (in this two-county example) is
therefore GIJK + EGF.  The analysis extends in a straightforward manner to a larger number of
counties.  Equivalent results can be obtained using demand functions for peanut quota (not shown) that
derive from the prices and cost curves in Figure 2.
When the expected level of production in a county is equal to that county's quota allocation, the
identification of points on county-level demand curves for quota is accomplished by subtracting quota11 In such instances, the estimation of the marginal costs of production is essentially identical as
for tobacco.  See Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner for a detailed discussion of the estimation procedure
in the tobacco context.
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lease rates from the edible support price at the quota quantity.11  When the expected level of
production in a county exceeds that county's quota allocation—that is, when additionals are
produced—the actual level of production (adjusted for variation due to weather conditions) combined
with the contract price for additionals (the average price at which additional peanuts are sold for in the
export market, an empirical proxy for Pw in Figures 1 and 2) can be used to identify points on county-
level marginal-cost curves.
The provision in the peanut program allowing for the production of additionals requires
consideration of distinct scenarios for the welfare analysis of quota transfer restrictions.  Two cases
other than that illustrated in Figure 2 are important for present purposes.  First, suppose in Figure 2 that
MC1, the marginal cost of production in the low-cost county, exceeded Pw at the quota output level
(Qq).  Then, with restrictions on the transfer of quota across county lines, neither county would produce
additionals.  In this case, the welfare gains from allowing intercounty transfer of quota are measured in
exactly the same manner as for the tobacco program (see Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner).  Second,
suppose that MC2, the marginal cost of production in the high-cost county, is less than Pw at the quota
output level (Qq).  In this case, and in the presence of restrictions on the transfer of quota, both counties
produce additionals.   This implies that the marginal costs of production are equal across counties and
that no welfare gains result from allowing the intercounty transfer of quota.
III.  Quota Transfer Post-FAIR: Empirical Analysis10
Substantial amounts of quota have migrated across county lines since the 1996 Act.  Table 1
reports a measure of quota movement for each of the seven major peanut producing states.  The
National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) reports county-level data on effective quota, which
includes the quota owned in a county and the quota that is leased in from other counties.  Thus, post-
1996, it includes all quota that has been transferred via lease or sale.  The economic model from the
previous section suggests that quota will move to equalize lease rates across counties.  Low lease rate
counties should include those that fail to meet or just meet their quota.  High lease rate counties should
include those that regularly produce additionals.  If it were known in advance that a county would fail to
meet its quota, the lease rate should be zero.  If it were known in advance that additionals would be
produced, the lease rate should equal the full difference between the support price and the world export
price.  If it were known in advance that the county would exactly hit its quota but no more, the lease
rate would fall between these values.
These arguments suggest an elementary prediction: that the lifting of transfer restrictions should
result in a movement of quota out of counties that under produce their quota.  A regression of changes
in county quota on additionals production, then, should have a positive slope.  The prediction of the
model is asymmetric.  It is additionals producing counties to which transferred quota will flow, but there
is no necessary connection between the extent to which an additionals-producing county overproduces
its quota and the extent of its quota inflow.  All additionals-producing counties are equally likely
candidates for absorbing quota.  Therefore, if one regresses changes in quota (from before to after the
lifting of transfer restrictions) on a measure of the tendency to produce additionals, one should find a
positive slope larger than one for under producing counties and no slope for additionals producing11
counties.
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The dependent variable is the change in effective quota between 1995 (the last year pre-FAIR)
and 2000.  This spans the lifting of transfer restrictions and allows five years for quota movement.  The
independent variable is additionals production in 1995: total peanut production less effective quota in
that year.  This is an imperfect measure.  What we would like is an ex ante measure of additionals
production instead of actual additionals production in a specific year.  In the same way that using
current income in a Keynesian consumption function biases the estimates of the consumption response
to a change in permanent income, our specification should bias downward the estimated effect of a
change in additionals production.  We currently are gathering and verifying data on multiple pre-FAIR
years, which will allow us to substitute an average of additionals production over time for the measure
that we use in the table 2 regressions.
The regression results in table 2 are remarkably consistent with the predictions of the model.  In12 In fact, a dichotomy between two types of counties is, perhaps, overly simplistic.  Farmers
might better be thought of as planting so as to maximize expected profits or expected utility.  Farmers
12
all states except for Florida and Virginia, the coefficient on additionals production for under producing
counties is greater than one with a t-ratio greater than 3.  The lack of significance of the coefficient in
the case of Florida is hardly surprising given that there were only three counties in the state that failed to
produce additionals in 1995.  The R2 statistics for several of the states are quite high, particularly so for
Oklahoma and Texas, in which high proportions of counties under produced their quota.  The
coefficients just discussed are mostly significantly greater than one statistically as well.
Just as the coefficients for under-quota counties are consistent with the predictions of the model
so too are the coefficients for over-quota counties.  The model predicts no particular relation for the
over-quota counties and the table 2 results bear this out.  In all cases except for Oklahoma and Texas,
the slope of the regression through over-quota counties is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  The
Texas and Oklahoma coefficients are significantly positive, but much less so (and statistically
significantly less so) than are the coefficients for under-quota counties.  The data are plotted along with
the estimated regression lines in Figure 3.
The county-level panel data allow the imposition and testing of various homogeneity restrictions. 
In particular, we tested for the equality of regression slopes across states, both for under-quota counties
and over-quota counties.  All such tests rejected at conventional levels.  We also estimated more
general versions of the table 2 regressions.  The hypothesis that over-quota counties should have a
different relation between quota movement and over-quota production than should under-quota
counties requires the identification of those counties that are over-quota.12  We do so here by thethen produce quantities greater than their quota with some probability other than zero or one.  See
Borges & Thurman and Babcock for models along these lines.
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criterion that over-quota counties produced peanuts in excess of their quota in 1995.  One could also
identify over-quota counties as those that produced more than (100+x)% of their quota in 1995.  We
estimated these switching regression models, varying x between -40 and +50.  By calculating the
likelihood value for each value of x over a grid, we estimated by maximum likelihood the cutoff x. 
Remarkably, the maximum likelihood estimate of x is 0 and it is fairly precisely estimated.  By inverting
the likelihood ratio statistic (see Meeker and Escobar, 1995) an approximate 95% confidence interval
for x is (-7.1, 10.3).  Clearly, the slope of the relationship changes, and changes near a level of
production approximately equal in percentage terms to a county’s quota.
IV.  Production Changes Post-FAIR
The U.S. peanut industry has been hit by large shocks over the last half decade.  The North
American Free Trade  Agreement and the World Trade Organization negotiations directly increased
imports of peanuts and peanut products into the United States, reducing the demand  for U.S. peanuts. 
While the U.S. peanut program still is intact, both support prices and quota levels are down by 10%
below pre-Fair levels.  These factors have led to changes in regional levels of peanut production.
Table 1 and figure 4 summarize changes in the geography of production since FAIR.  To
capture effects pre- and post-FAIR we compare the 1994-1995 period with the 1999-2000 period. 
The largest producing states are Georgia and Texas, but their stories are dramatically different.  While
the traditional front runner, Georgia, produced more than 1.3 billion pounds in 2000, its production
declined by 16% over the 1994-2000 period.  Production in number two Texas was  675 million14
pounds in 2000,  representing a remarkable 40% increase from pre-FAIR levels.  (Even more
remarkable were the levels of production in Texas in the late 1990's, which reached 900 million pounds
before dropping sharply in 2000.)  The growth in Texas production is remarkable because it is unique
among the states.  Total national production declined by 8% over the 1994-2000 period.  Among other
peanut-producing states, only Florida (which grew by 16%) saw positive growth.  Notably, Texas’
neighbor state of Oklahoma produced 31% fewer peanuts in the later period than in the earlier period. 
Post-FAIR movements in quota were the subject of the previous section.  Quota relocation
tends to equalize lease rates across counties and shifts production out of counties that either fail to meet
quota or just barely meet quota in a typical year.  Such movement makes peanut growing less profitable
and reduces production in counties from which quota migrates.  It also increases the income to quota
owners in those same counties.  But, the movement of quota cannot explain the production increases
we have seen in Texas, or the declines in most other states.  What drives changes in national and state
production levels is the profitability at the margin of peanut operations: the profit from producing
peanuts for the export market.  
Because Texas quota production has been a constant proportion of the fairly constant national
quota, the increase in Texas production has come entirely in the form of additional peanuts, produced
either for the export or crush markets.  Additionals production in Texas increased from 85 million
pounds to almost 600 million pounds over the 1995-1999 period before dropping to about 350 million
pounds in 2000.  Prices received for those peanuts averaged just over $300 per ton, compared with a
current quota support price of $610 per ton.
Apart from the dramatic growth in production, there have been major shifts in the location of15
production in the post-FAIR period (see figure 5).  The greatest growth has occurred in the High Plains
area, containing Yoakum, Terry, Gaines, Dawson, and Collingsworth counties.  The High Plains area,
irrigated out of the Ogalala aquifer, increased its total production by 540 million pounds between 1995
and 1999.  Quota production in the region has grown only by about 100 million pounds.
At the same time that the High Plains dramatically increased its acreage and production, the two
other producing regions in the state declined.  Peanut production in the Rolling Plains, southeast of the
High Plains and stretching from Abilene to Dallas, almost disappeared over the 1995-1999 period
declining from 168 million pounds to 32 million pounds.  Quota fled the area at the same time, falling
from 237 million pounds to 92 million pounds.  (Notice that the Rolling Plains under produced its quota
both at the beginning and at the end of the period.)  The third major producing region, the Coastal Bend
(including Frio and Atascosa counties) receives more rainfall than the High Plains and irrigation there is
less critical.  The Coastal Bend saw much of its quota leave, a decline from 167 million pounds of quota
in 1995 to 85 million pounds in 1999.  Production in the Coastal Bend declined more moderately, from
127 million pounds to 102 million pounds.
The movement of both production and quota away from the Rolling Plains and Coastal Bend
and toward the High Plains suggests that quota migrated out of counties that produced only their quota
(or less) prior to 1996.  As a result of the loosening of transfer restrictions, a county in which quota
rental rates were near zero prior to 1996 can be expected to have reduced both its total production and
quota production, with the reduction in quota typically larger than the reduction in production.  This is
what we see in both the Rolling Plains and the Coastal Bend.
The geographic shifts just described imply a dramatic concentration of production in a small16
number of counties.  The counties that have gained the most are those already mentioned: Dawson,
Gaines, Terry, Yoakum, and Collingsworth in the High Plains and Frio and Atascosa in the Rolling
Plains.  The five biggest peanut-producing counties in 1999 almost quadrupled production over 1995
levels.  Compare this to the state-wide increase in production, which represents just a doubling.  
The share of state production held by the five large counties in 1995 was 29%.  In 1999 the
five-county share grew to 66%.  The production shares of the next five biggest producing counties,
numbers six through 10, declined modestly over the 1995-1999 period, but the bulk of the increase in
the share of top-five county production came from a dramatic reduction in the share of production from
the smallest 100 peanut producing counties.  These smallest producers accounted for almost half of
peanut production in 1995.  By 1999, their share had fallen to under 20% and their tonnage of
production had declined in absolute terms as well.
What are the reasons for the rapid growth in Texas and, in particular, in the High Plains?  Was
it related to the FAIR Act?  Four reasons that market observers cite are (1) the availability of water in
Texas; virtually all of the Texas growth has come about in irrigated acreage, (2) a greater resistance to
disease in Texas because peanuts are grown on land that has not recently been planted in peanuts, (3)
the development of new larger harvesting equipment, and (4) a decline in cotton prices, an alternative
crop to peanuts in Texas.  But in order to explain the Texas phenomenon, there must have been
changes in these factors over the last several years.  As a wise man once said, you can’t explain change
with a constant.  This principle would rule out explanations (1) and (2)–water did not just recently
become available in Texas nor is the resistance to disease a recent development.  Moreover, a useful
explanation must be consistent with the fact that production did not dramatically increase in other states17
over the same period.  The development of new equipment, explanation (3),  should have had similar
effects elsewhere.
Perhaps the most convincing explanation is the fourth, that cotton in the High Plains has become
less profitable and that irrigated peanuts are an attractive substitute crop for irrigated cotton.  A look at
the data supports this interpretation: irrigated cotton acreage has declined in the High Plains by roughly
the same amount as irrigated peanut acreage has grown.  (Acreage in dryland cotton has not declined,
but that is because it is grown in rotation with peanuts.)   Important factors responsible for the shift out
of cotton include increased costs in the High Plains associated with an increasing boll weevil problem
and lower market prices for cotton. Part of the decline in the profitability of cotton may also be
attributed to FAIR, which by eliminating target prices and deficiency payments may have reduced
incentives to produce.  The cotton connection can explain the trend in the High Plains area but does not
apply to other producing regions in Texas, in which peanut acreage actually has declined.  In the other
regions, cotton and peanuts are not such natural substitutes.  Production conditions and changes in
these regions are more similar to other states, with peanut production post-FAIR either growing
modestly or declining.
Will the Texas share of national peanut markets continue to grow?  To the extent that the
declining profitability of cotton has abated, the shifts out of cotton acreage will be a one-time
phenomenon.  In fact, one could point to 2000 production in Texas as an indication that the
phenomenon has peaked: Texas’ share of national peanut production fell in 2000, for the first time in
five years, from 24% to 21%.  However, planted acreage was at an all-time high and the production
decline was due to poor yields.  Further, recent investments in peanut handling infrastructure in the High18
Plains could constitute a base for further growth in peanuts.  Tempering any prediction must be the fact
that new farm legislation is not far off and, if incentives to produce cotton are restored, the balance
could tilt in cotton’s favor in Texas once again.19





Percent of State Quota
Moving Across County
Lines**
Georgia 1,339 -16% 9%
Texas 675 40% 53%
North Carolina 357 -21% 7%
Alabama 273 -22% 9%
Virginia 214 -13% 7%
Florida 205 16% 8%
Oklahoma 131 -31% 36%
U.S. Total  3,288 -8%
*  Pre-FAIR production is the average of production in years 1994 and 1995.  Post-FAIR production
is the average of production in years 1999 and 2000.
**  Quota movement is measured as the net change in effective quota in quota-increasing counties
between 1995 and 2000.20
Table 2.  Explaining Cross-County Quota Movement with Additionals Production:  Linear
Regressions by State
Dependent Variable: Change in Quota, 1995-2000
State
1995 Additionals Production
(For Counties Under Quota)
1995 Additionals Production













*† (1.59) -.03 (.13) .47 21 13
Florida .21 (5.27) -.08 (.07) .06 24 21
Georgia 1.77
* (.43) .03 (.08) .21 79 56
North Carolina 4.96
*† (1.10) -.29 (.22) .48 28 19
Oklahoma 1.50
*† (.14) 2.62
*† (.52) .84 42 15
Texas 1.62
*† (.22) .81
* (.07) .70 98 39
Virginia .54 (.32) .06 (6.34) .36 13 2
Key:
* denotes rejection of Ho: â=0 against HA: â>0 at a significance level less than .01.






































The Effects of Allowing
Intercounty Transfer of Peanut Quota23
Figure 3.  Scatter Plots for the Table 2 Regressions
Thousands of Pounds24
Figure 3–continued.  Scatter Plots for the Table 2 Regressions
Thousands of Pounds25
Figure 4.









Shifts in Texas Production 
Since the FAIR Act
Produc tion increase d by more than  30 %
Produc tion c ha nged by les s than 30 %
Produc tion dec rea sed by m ore tha n 30%
Figure 5.27
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